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By utilizing a non-parametric Malmquist index approach, we investigate the initial 
changes in the productivity and efficiency of the “traditional” Turkish banks in an era of 
financial liberalization (1980-1990). We hypothesize that the new liberal environment along 
with heightened competition from new banks coming from internal and external markets will 
discipline the traditional banks that are coming from the pre-liberalization period in resource 
management to economize their production inputs and/or in looking for new ways to expand 
their financial outputs, resulting in higher productivity and efficiency in these banks. 
Consistent with the expectations, we found that there is a significant upward trend in the 
productivity and efficiency of the traditional Turkish banks over the period under study. On 
the other hand, the results also indicate that the production technology of these banks has not 
advanced as expected. It appears that productivity growth in traditional Turkish banks 
mainly stems from the efforts of inefficient banks to catch up with the leading banks 
(efficiency increase) rather than the expansion of production frontier by the leading banks 
(technological progress).     
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Liberal policies are typically undertaken to increase competition among firms 
and in turn foster their performance. Efficient use of factors of production can 
result in better resource allocation, which is a positive outcome for the entire 
economy. Heightened productivity and efficiency in financial institutions can lead 
to price reductions and service expansions, which are certainly favorable outcomes 
for customers. Moreover, enhanced productive efficiency in the provision of 
financial services may bring additional savings on inputs and operating costs. If 
those operational savings can be translated into bottom line profits, then financial 
firms are more likely to survive and stay afloat, which is obviously a desirable 
result for the regulators and shareholders of financial firms.  
In the early 1980s, Turkey introduced a ‘stabilization and liberalization 
program’ to promote private market forces and open its economy to the world. The 
main theme was to enhance the international competitiveness of Turkish firms in all 
fronts, especially against a challenging business environment that will emerge with 
a possible European Union membership. Towards this end, domestic markets were 
opened up to new firms and import substitution policies were lifted in favor of 
export-oriented polices. Deregulation of the financial sector has undergone 
throughout the 1980s in parallel with this main spirit. Interest rate ceilings were 
abolished, financial taxes, reserve and liquidity requirements were reduced, 
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions were relaxed, money and capital 
markets were established. In this line, the reopening of Istanbul Stock Exchange 
(ISE) in 1986 was a keynote achievement, which enriched the array of funding 
sources for Turkish firms. As universal banks, Turkish banks have engaged in 
underwriting and trading in public or private securities, which provided additional 
income for Turkish banks.  
The new competitive environment was expected to discipline domestic financial 
institutions in resource management and provision of better and more financial 
services and products at fairer prices. As a result of relaxation of entry barriers, 
several new banks have entered the market. The number of de novo banks began to 
match the number of existent banks by 1990. Substantial number of new entries and 
increased banking costs after interest rate deregulation threatened the survival and 
franchise value of traditional banks. In order to adapt to new conditions and 
compete effectively with the new comers from internal and external markets, 
existent Turkish banks looked for ways to improve their performance. They began  
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acquiring new technologies and developing new practices to control costs and boost 
profits. For this purpose, some of them established joint ventures with foreign 
banks that own better technology, marketing strategies and international 
experience. Moreover, in the new environment, soaring inflation resulted it strong 
mismatches between asset and liability structures of firms. Thus, maturity and 
liquidity risks of all banks, new or old, have exacerbated substantially during this 
period.  
So far, empirical studies from different episodes around the world have not 
produced consistent results about the relationship between liberalization and bank 
performance. In some episodes, banks experienced better performance in a more 
liberal environment such as in Norway (Berg, Forsund, and Jansen; 1992), 
Thailand (Leightner and Lovell, 1998), Taiwan (Shyu, 1998), Korea (Gilbert and 
Wilson, 1998), India (Bhattacharya et al., 1997) and transition economies of 
Europe (Hasan and Marlton, 2001 and Yildirim and Philippatos, 2002). In some 
cases, deregulation brought about a reduction in measured performance rather than 
an improvement, such as in the US (Bauer, Berger, and Humphrey, 1993; 
Humphrey, 1993; Grabowski et al., 1994; Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995; Humphrey 
and Pulley, 1997; Wheelock and Wilson, 1999)
1 and Spain (Grifell-Tatje and 
Lovell, 1997; Lozano, 1995; Kumbhakar, Lozana-Vivas, Lovell, and Hasan, 2001). 
Thus, the short run effects of deregulation may be discouraging as evidenced in 
some country episodes. Based on these findings, Berger and Humphrey (1997) in 
their survey study urge more studies to draw a conclusion about the impact of 
deregulation on competition, efficiency and productivity of the financial sector. 
To our knowledge, no empirical work has studied the effects of strong 
environmental changes on the performance of Turkish traditional banks. We define 
traditional banks as the banks that were existent before liberalization and thus 
coming from a “quiet life” environment in which they were protected against 
competition from internal and external markets. One key goal of liberalization is to 
discipline traditional banks by new entries. Thus, the goal of this paper is to 
investigate how regulatory changes and new bank entries affected the technical 
progress, efficiency change and productivity growth in the existent traditional 
banks in Turkey. Neither the above international studies nor earlier Turkish studies 
has looked at the impact of liberalization on the efficiency and productivity of 
                                                           
1 However, two recent studies by DeYoung et al. (1998) and Mukherjee et al. (2001) provide some 
evidence on the positive impact of lifting restrictions on nation-wide branching and interest rate 
deregulation on the performance of US banks.    
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traditional banks per se. These studies have used mixed samples that contain both 
de novo and traditional banks. As compared to traditional banks, new banks may 
have different technologies and initial set-up costs and problems. Consistent with 
learning by doing hypothesis, Mester (1996) found that inefficient banks tend to be 
younger even though after de novo banks were excluded from the study due to their 
likely high start-up costs. Similarly, albeit weak, Berger and Mester (1997) reported 
a positive relationship between age and cost efficiency. A recent study by DeYoung 
and Hasan (1998) focused particularly on the efficiency of the U.S. chartered new 
banks. Their results suggested that on average it takes new banks about nine years 
to catch up with traditional banks. Because new banks are more likely to need more 
time to establish the necessary customer relationships and expand their operations 
to fully utilize scale economies, the existence of de novo banks in a sample may 
blur the true effect of the reforms on performance. The fact that half of the Turkish 
banks in the industry entered the system between the period 1980 and 1990 justifies 
this concern. Therefore, to control for such bias, we focus on only traditional banks 
that were in existence before and after the financial deregulation. 
Most of the earlier studies were limited to a couple of years before and after 
liberalization. However, in order to control the impact of arbitrary selection of the 
reference and comparison years on the qualitative results, measurement over longer 
time periods is needed (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Thus, using a panel data and 
a long chain of Malmquist index approach, we measure the productivity change in 
Turkish traditional banks between 1980 and 1990 period. On the other hand, some 
may suggest that even an eleven-year term is not long enough to investigate fully 
the effects of the liberalization on banking with regard to the productivity change. 
Although such a concern is understandable, we need to emphasize the fact that as 
the title implies the objective of this article is only to search the initial effects of the 
regulatory changes and new banks entries on the productivity growth of traditional 
Turkish banks. In this respect, there is apparently a room for further research to 
investigate such effects within a longer period by taking this limitation of the 
current study into account. 
For further analysis, we decompose the productivity change index into its two 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive components, efficiency change (a measure of 
catching up with the best-practice banks), and technical change (a measure of 
innovation in the production technology). We also divide the efficiency change 
index into two independent parts, ‘pure’ efficiency change (improvements in  
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management) and scale efficiency change (improvements towards an optimum 
size). We model banks as 3-output and 3-input multi product firms. Our 
specification of bank inputs and outputs reflects the recent trends in the nature of 
commercial banking in Turkey and elsewhere. We consider some other important 
bank outputs in our model such as interbank loans, directed loans and private and 
public security investments. Our results indicate that all types of traditional banks 
operating in Turkey (private or public; foreign or domestic) experienced 
considerable productivity gains. Also, despite its lower pace in the initial phase of 
liberalization, the productivity of traditional banks has substantially risen in parallel 
with the acceleration of the reforms. The dominant source driving productivity in 
traditional banks was efficiency increases resulting from improved managerial 
practices rather than improved scales. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we summarize the reforms that 
affected the operations of traditional banks in Turkey. In section 3, we explain the 
model we use in constructing productivity and efficiency indices of traditional 
banks. In section 4, we discuss the empirical setting. In section 5, we examine the 
performance of the traditional banks after liberalization. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Financial Liberalization and Traditional Banks 
The Turkish financial system has been dominated by the banking sector that 
accommodates universal banks. There has been no significant competition from the 
non-bank financial institutions and the sector is highly concentrated. Government 
ownership has been very important in the banking sector. Moreover, industrial and 
commercial conglomerates have controlled majority of the private banks. The co-
existence of state and private banks in the system has been the legacy of the 
historical developments in Turkey. The economic model pursued throughout the 
1930s and 1940s was closer to the socialist experiences, and, 'state economic 
enterprises' were assigned as the engine of industrial growth. During these decades, 
the policies of industrialization through the initiative of the state resulted in the 
establishment of a group of state-owned banks to provide credit and promote 
investments in particular sectors of the economy. Over time, these banks diverged 
considerably from their particular targets and began to operate as universal 
commercial banks with an emphasis on retail business. After this period, when 
private enterprises prospered under protectionist import substitution policies, the 
state banks performed a critical role in channeling foreign aid and credit as well as 
domestic public credit to private industry. Furthermore, in the same period private  
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companies began to establish their own banks primarily for their own financial 
needs.  
After the mid-1960s to January 1980, the industrialization strategy was based on 
import substitution (through protectionist policies) and the financial system was 
structured so as to satisfy the needs of this industrialization policy. In this 
environment, the financial system was highly repressed by extensive state 
intervention. In other words, the state was controlling the allocation of two critical 
resources in the economy, namely, foreign currency and credits with reference to 
‘political priorities’. Therefore, both exchange rates and interest rates were 
administratively defined at below the market rates.  
As a result, deposit collection at administratively defined low interest rates had 
become the main area of competition in the banking sector. Consequently, large 
branch networks were developed, with an estimated average number of 250 new 
branch offices opened annually between 1970 and 1981 (Akguc, 1989). 
Apparently, the only way for the banks to increase profitability was through 
excessive growth such as opening new branches. In other words, the industry was 
protected and accustomed to non-price competition. However this policy had 
increased costs and produced a distinctive oligopolistic market structure. In this 
environment, the banks focused their attention inwards by structuring their 
organization around their own operational procedures, rather than around 
customers' financial needs and problems.  
The structural adjustment program introduced in January 1980 has changed 
traditional protectionist economic policies and has promoted more integration with 
the world economy. The government adopted policies to deregulate the financial 
system further. The main components of the program were liberalization of the 
exchange rates, interest rates as well as institutional reforms in capital and 
monetary markets.
2 The aim was to make the operations of banks more efficient in 
line with the new economic policy stance, and prevent the possibility of a financial 
crisis resulting due to a lack of institutional regulations. As a reflection of liberal 
policies, foreign banks were allowed to operate in the domestic market from 1981 
onwards with the expectation of capital inflows, increasing competition and 
efficiency, and gaining international and domestic banking know-how. Moreover, 
in this period the government introduced new institutions, legal arrangements and 
                                                           
2 These changes imply the end of financial repression and experience of interest rate and exchange rate 
risks for the first time.   
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even instruments to the financial markets. The government also allowed domestic 
new entries into the market. Initially, unregulated brokerage houses entered into the 
financial market in the early 1980s. Four Islamic financial institutions followed this 
from 1985 onwards. Therefore, the traditional banks had to offer competitive 
interest rates on saving accounts to attract and/or maintain their customers against 
the new firms. This has increased the cost of funding and also credit interest rates. 
Because of the high capital requirements and the cost of establishing nation-wide 
branch networks, new entrants and the existing small banks tend not to compete for 
retail deposits. For example, foreign banks operated on a limited basis with few 
branches, and had a very small share of the banking sector.
3 Despite their 
insignificant market share, the entry of foreign banks together with the 
liberalization of the financial system has contributed to the banking sector 
substantially by increasing the diversification and quality of banking services. For 
instance, foreign banks were the first to introduce marketing departments and 
strategies in Turkey.  
As mentioned, although there exist a few empirical studies investigating the 
episode of the Turkish financial liberalization, none of them has investigated the 
impact of regulatory reforms and new entries (domestic or foreign) on the 
productive performance of the traditional Turkish banks per se. For example, 
employing a nonparametric approach, Zaim (1995) found that economic efficiency 
of the Turkish institutions in 1990 was higher than that in 1981. However, he did 
not dwell on whether production frontier has expanded or contracted (technological 
progress or regress) or whether the average bank was able to produce more output 
with a given level of inputs (productivity growth or fall) in the post-liberalization 
era than in the pre-liberalization era.
4 Denizer (1997) examined the impact of the 
new entries following the deregulation on banking competition in Turkey. Using 
the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, he tested market structure and 
efficient structure hypotheses and found evidence in favor of the former. In other 
                                                           
3 As a result, after the entry of foreign banks, the competitiveness of the sector did not increase 
significantly in terms of deposit collection type of retail activities. However, since the interest and 
exchange rates regimes were liberalized these new entrants operate effectively in wholesale activities 
such as foreign trade financing. 
4 Productivity and efficiency are two interrelated, but different terms. Efficiency of banks can increase 
when banks get closer to the efficient production frontier, which itself could either contract or expand. 
Even if banks stay at their original position between two years (their productivity does not change), their 
efficiency (the proximity to the efficient frontier) could still increase if the production frontier contracts 
due to regress.   
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words, according to him, the superior performance was driven by market power.
5 
Our study will complement the limited literature on Turkish liberalization by 
focusing its impact on the productivity and efficiency change of traditional banks. 
3. Methodology 
Because we do not know the production technology of a fully efficient firm in a 
banking industry, we should estimate it from the observations in practice. Thus, we 
first map firms in an input-output space to detect the best-practice firm or the 
production frontier (i.e., technology), which depict the maximum performance 
possible by firms. Then, we contrast existing firms to this frontier because it 
represents the set of efficient observations for which no other production unit 
employs as little or less of every input without changing the output quantities 
generated or produces as much or more of every output without altering the input 
quantities used. However, production technology may change over time, resulting 
in shifts in the best practice technical frontier, because of experience, increased 
knowledge, better production techniques, new innovations, financial liberalization 
or chaos and heightened competition.  
In this study, we employ the DEA-type Malmquist productivity change index, 
which is dubbed after Sten Malmquist, a Swedish economist and statistician, in 
order to investigate the impact of the financial liberalization on the performance of 
the traditional Turkish commercial banks. Following Fare et al. (1994), we specify 
the output-orientated Malmquist total factor productivity change (TFPCH) index, 
M, as the geometric mean of two Malmquist productivity indexes, M1 and M2 . 
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  (1) 
Equation 1assumes that a bank was observed at the combination (xt , yt) in year t, 
whereas in year t+1, it was observed at the combination (xt+1 , yt+1). The first term 
(M1) represents the Malmquist productivity change index obtained relative to the 
benchmark technology in period t, whereas the second term (M2) represents the 
                                                           
5 Denizer’s study (1997) is based on standard accounting ratios rather than production frontiers. Isik and 
Hassan (2002) examine the performance of Turkish banks during the liberalization period but they do not 
make a distinction between traditional and non-traditional banks. They look at the overall performance of 
the entire banking industry including new and old banks.  
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Malmquist productivity change index calculated relative to the benchmark 
technology in period t+1. The representation of productivity change as geometric 
mean of these two output based Malmquist TFPCH indexes [M = (M1× M 2)
1/2] 
precludes arbitrariness in choosing the reference technology.
6 
Malmquist index (M) allows us to distinguish between shifts in the production 
frontier (technology change, TECCH) and movements of firms towards the frontier 
(efficiency change, EFFCH). Thus, Malmquist total factor productivity change 
index, TFPCH, is simply the product of efficiency change (EFFCH), how much 
closer a bank gets to the efficient frontier (catching up or falling behind), and 
technological change (TECCH), how much the benchmark production frontier 
shifts at each bank’s observed input mix (innovation or shock). We obtain the 
TECCH and EFFCH indexes under the assumption of constant returns to scale 
(CRS), i.e., assuming that banks operate at an optimum scale for cost minimization. 
However, in reality, banks could face scale inefficiencies due to decreasing returns 
to scale (DRS) or increasing returns to scale (IRS) in their operations resulting from 
market or regulatory constraints. When we relax the CRS assumption and adopt the 
more realistic variable returns to scale assumption (VRS), we become able to 
decompose EFFCH index into pure efficiency change (PEFFCH) and scale 
efficiency change (SCH) components. PEFFCH index measures the changes in the 
proximity of firms to the frontier, devoid of scale effects. SCH shows whether the 
movements inside the frontier are in the right direction to attain the CRS point, 
where changes in output result in proportional changes in costs. Briefly, TFPCH = 
TECCH × EFFCH and EFFCH = PEFFCH × SCH. Thus, TFPCH = TECCH × 
PEFFCH × SCH. These Malmquist indexes can attain a value greater than, equal to, 
or less than unity depending on whether a bank experiences growth, stagnation or 
decline, respectively, between periods t and t+1. We estimate them utilizing Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. This methodology has become standard by 
now in the literature. Please see Bauer et al. (1998), Wheelock and Wilson (1999) 




                                                           
6 M defines the productivity of the production point (xt+1 , yt+1) with respect to the production point (xt , 
yt) according to both years’ technologies.  
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3. Data and Descriptive Statistics of Traditional Banks  
The data used in this study come from the Banks Association of Turkey (BAT). 
As aforesaid, we define traditional banks as the banks that were in existence before 
liberalization. We have a balanced panel data of total 280 observation points, which 
span the time horizon of 1981 through 1990. Table 1 provides the summary 
statistics of traditional banks in our sample such as their specialization areas, 
ownership structure, size and traditional performance measures for profitability, 
ROE (return on equity) and ROA (return on assets), in 1981 and 1990. Out of 56 
commercial banks in the system in 1990, half are coming from the pre-
liberalization era (traditional banks) and half are the new banks (non-traditional 
banks) that entered the market in the post liberalization era. Apparently, there are 
only 28 traditional banks, of which 8 are state banks, 16 private banks and 4 foreign 
banks. As shown in this table, all these banks are universal commercial banks, 
although some of the state-owned banks were initially established for supporting 
specific sectors, such as agriculture, mining and energy or textile. The footnotes of 
the table give brief information on that issue as well as detailed information is 
provided in the following paragraphs of this section.
7 
Before focusing on the ROE and ROA values, the employment figures in the 
table may supply interesting explanations. For instance, the number of employees 
of the public banks increased over 42% between 1981-1990 while this figure for 
the private banks increased only over 15% and, decreased 6% for the foreign banks. 
This reflects the fact that several privately owned banks were merged with some of 
the public banks in this period. For example, Istanbul Bankasi, Hisarbank and 
Ortadoğu Iktisat Bankasi were merged with T.C. Ziraat Bankasi in 1983 due to 
their unsustainable financial difficulties. Another financial institution, Istanbul 
Emniyet Sandigi, was also merged with Ziraat Bankasi in 1984. This is reflected by 
the employment figures of Ziraat Bankasi, which jumped from 5,465 to 11,240. 
The merger of Anadolu Bankasi with Turkiye Emlak Bankasi in 1988 provides a 
                                                           
7 Seven of the Turkish traditional banks under consideration in this study already existed before 1923. 
Foreign banks played an important role in the Turkish (Ottoman) banking sector from its inception. 
Osmanli Bankasi (Ottoman Bank) was established in 1856 mainly to intermediate between the foreign 
lenders and the Ottoman Empire that was heavily in need of debt financing. The majority shareholders of 
the bank were the British and French entrepreneurs although the capital had also a Turkish portion. The 
bank also served as a central bank to the Republic until 1930 as well as the Empire. It then became a 
middle-sized universal commercial bank in the following period. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, the first national 
bank in the Turkish history, was established in 1863; gained a full state-owned status in 1916. 
Uluslararasi Endustri ve Ticaret Bankasi (1888, originally a partly foreign-owned bank – Selanik 
Bankasi), Milli Aydin Bankasi (1913, originally a regional bank) and Turk Ticaret Bankasi (1913, 
originally a regional bank) were also established by private capital. Two foreign banks, Banca Di Roma 
and Hollantse Bank opened their branches in Istanbul in 1913 and 1921 respectively.  
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similar example. The only exception among the public banks in the table in terms 
of the employment issue is Turkiye Ogretmenler Bankasi since it did not increase 
the number of staff employed during this period. This bank was originally a private 
bank; but due to serious financial difficulties, the government acquired it in 1987. 
This could be the reason why the bank did not change its employment level 
upward.   
In this period, due to the upward trend in interest rates after liberalization, 
growth through opening new branches lost its attractiveness as a general policy in 
the banking sector. Albeit this was true, some regional small banks adopted a 
different approach to enlarge their operations to the country level by opening new 
branches. Employment figures, again, can give interesting information in this 
respect such as those of Iktisat Bankasi, Turk Dis Ticaret Bankasi, Milli Aydin 
Bankasi, Turkiye Tutunculer Bankasi or Demirbank. On the contrary, those such as 
Turkiye Is Bankasi, Akbank and Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi did not increase their staff 
numbers significantly in comparison with the others in the same group as they had 
already large and established branch networks. Unlike the other banks in the sector, 
foreign banks had a distinctive strategy, as they were generally involved in trade 
finance for multinationals operating in the country. This can also be seen in their 
employment figures. It should be noted that those four banks in this group differ 
from each other in some respects. For example, Banca Di Roma and Holantse Bank 
were operating only as branches of their head offices established in Italy and the 
Netherlands while Osmanli Bankasi and Arap Turk Bankasi were themselves 
originally established in Turkey. Therefore the last two resemble their native 
counterparts more than their peers in the same group. For instance, Osmanli 
Bankasi was also serving to other segments of the market such as branch banking 
next to trade financing services. This was true even though its number of personnel 
decreased by 11% between 1981-1990. Only Arap Turk Bankasi was an exception 
with regard to the employment issue among the foreign banks with a high increase 
around 60%. We may suggest that this was caused by the latter’s aim to enlarge its 
operations similar to the native counterparts, as it entered into the market in 1977. 
However, Osmanli Bankasi had already a considerably large branch network. 
Therefore apart from Arap Turk Bankasi those foreign banks initiated a 
restructuring of their organizations to have efficiency gains because profits were 
under pressure of cost increases caused by increased competition. As can easily be 
expected, these were the most dynamic banks in the market because of their foreign 
origins and hence superior perception for the coming market conditions. In other  
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words they had the advantage of foreseeing the future better because of their 
management experiences acquired in other countries and adopting appropriate 
strategies.   
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of the Traditional Turkish Banks (1981-1990) 
Bank Size Bank Profitability Name Specialization 
#o fE m p . ROA (%) ROE (%)
   1981 1990 1981 1990 1981 1990 
PUBLIC BANKS           
Denizcilik Bankasi  Commercial
1 905 1137 -10.80 -1.96 -33.70  -15.39 
Etibank Bankacilik  Commercial
2 2305 3018 2.58 -1.15 11.57  -3.75 
Sumerbank                               Commercial
3 667 750 -1.41 0.07 -3.62  0.26 
T. Ogretmenler B.  Commercial
4 1975 1972 1.27 0.13 49.05  1.52 
T.C. Ziraat Bankasi                  Commercial
5 30681 40381 3.55 3.04 120.30  36.33 
Turkiye Emlak Bankasi           Commercial
6 5465 11240 2.06 0.68 11.13  98.09 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi              Commercial
7 9804 14252 4.07 0.49 82.30  4.66 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi        Commercial  5120 8075 0.06 2.51 4.96 41.96 
Average  7115 10103 0.17 0.48 30.25  20.46 
PRIVATE BANKS      
Akbank                                     Commercial  9879 9979 0.85 6.82 40.52  52.84 
Demirbank                               Commercial  232 594 0.10 1.99 1.19  37.37 
Egebank                                   Commercial  407 759 4.97 0.74 83.12  5.63 
Eskisehir Bankasi                     Commercial  345 959 0.86 3.02 16.80  31.17 
Iktisat Bankasi                         Commercial  131 733 0.19 1.82 2.86  17.38 
Milli Aydin Bankasi                Commercial  245 684 1.90 3.24 17.59  49.89 
Pamukbank                               Commercial  2385 2999 1.41 0.72 61.12  9.29 
Sekerbank                                 Commercial  2396 3310 0.02 3.64 0.47  37.02 
Turk Dis Ticaret Bankasi         Commercial  351 972 8.05 3.68 325.69  41.04 
Turk Ticaret Bankasi               Commercial  6771 8276 1.07 1.41 55.26  18.95 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi          Commercial  3548 5602 0.11 3.17 3.25  42.35 
Turkiye Imar Bankasi              Commercial  376 529 0.45 1.83 4.19  29.06 
Turkiye Is Bankasi                   Commercial  20304 19095 1.11 1.07 73.96  13.34 
Turkiye Tutunculer Bankasi    Commercial  428 1185 0.29 2.91 2.17  35.62 
Uluslararasi End. ve Tic. B.  Commercial  317 635 1.54 5.34 74.31  54.03 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi             Commercial  9002 9769 0.26 2.78 10.44 49.71 
Average  3570 4130 1.45 2.76 48.31  32.79 
FOREIGN BANKS      
Arap Turk Bankasi                   Commercial
8 165 265 6.99 -6.59 383.53  -41.46 
Banca Di Roma                        Commercial
8 119 93 8.76 2.00 181.36  35.04 
Holantse Bank                          Commercial
8 93 69 10.02 6.29 61.33  39.25 
Osmanli Bankasi                      Commercial  1583 1409 1.33 3.15 110.29 53.37 
Average     490 459 6.78 1.21 184.12  21.55 
1 Denizcilik Bankasi was established originally for marine business financing. 
2 Etibank was established originally for finance and investment in the mining and energy sectors.
 
3 Sumerbank was established originally for finance and investment in the textile and footwear sectors.
 
4 T. Ogretmenler Bankasi was established originally for housing finance particularly for teachers.
 
5 Although a commercial universal bank, T.C. Ziraat Bankasi has been assigned for financing of the 
agricultural sector. 
 
6 Although a commercial universal bank, T. Emlak Bankasi had been assigned for housing finance.  
 
7 Although a commercial universal bank, T. Halk Bankasi has been assigned for small business 
financing.
 
8 These banks have a particular focus on trade financing. 
Concerning the public banks in Table 1, average ROE declined from 30.25% in 
1981 to 20.46% in 1990, while average ROA rose during the same period from 
0.17% to 0.48%. A similar trend also applied to the private banks for ROE during  
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in this period, from 48.31% to 32.79%, while ROA rose from 1.45% to 2.76%. 
Regarding the foreign banks, on the other hand, ROE decreased sharply from 
184.12% in 1981 to 21.55% in 1990, while ROA also decreased from a high of 
6.78% to 1.21%. Those results were mainly due to the liberalization policies 
adopted after 1980 in the country. In this period the government allowed new 
entries into the market. As well as some new banks, special finance houses 
transacting business according to Islamic banking principles also became part of the 
financial system after 1985. This intensified competition in the sector and therefore 
caused a downward trend particularly in the average ROE of the banks. Those 
significant differences between the average ROE and ROA figures indicate the fact 
that these banks were relying on debt financing significantly. With regard to the 
public and private banks, furthermore, the average ROA increased while the 
average ROE decreased. This was partly caused by the fact that new entries led 
these banks to have lesser shares of the total deposits in the market. This meant 
smaller equity multipliers for individual banks. In addition, while the deposit 
interest rates increased (higher costs), the credits interest rates applied were also 
higher than before. Therefore, assuming that for an individual bank the amount of 
total assets was the same, its return was higher than the pre-liberalization period 
(higher ROA).     
4. Empirical Setting and Design  
Before estimating productivity change index and its components, we first ought 
to determine a model of bank production. There are two rival approaches in the 
literature in specifying the multiple inputs and outputs of the banks. One approach, 
known as production approach, defines bank output much more with engineering 
mentality; the number of deposit and loan accounts serviced by banks is considered 
as the output portfolio of banks. According to this approach, labor and physical 
capital are the resources making up the input portfolio of banks. Another but more 
common approach, termed as intermediation approach, treats banks as 
intermediaries, with outputs measured in dollar amounts rather than physical units 
and with labor, capital, and various deposits specified as inputs. We adopt the 
intermediation approach rather than production approach to define the inputs and 
outputs of banks because we, like majority of the associates in the literature, believe 
that the former reflects banking production process better. All variables except for 
the input factor labor are adjusted for inflation using the $US equivalents of these 
variables.   
 
 




Annual Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of Outputs and Inputs for the Traditional 
Turkish Banks (in million $US) 













































































































































































Accordingly, we selected the following three items as inputs, i.e., factors of 
production employed by the Turkish banks to produce their products and services: 
(1) labor, (2) physical capital, and (3) funds. We measure the quantity of labor by 
the number of full-time employees on the payroll, capital by the book value of 
premises and fixed assets, and funds by the sum of deposit (demand and time) and 
non-deposit funds as of the end of the respective year.
8 The following three items 
                                                           
8 Non-deposit funds are borrowed funds from interbank, central bank, domestic banks, abroad and others 
as well as funds raised by issuing securities.  
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are chosen as the outputs of the Turkish banks: (1) short-term loans, (2) long-term 
loans, and (3) other earning assets. Short-term loans and long-term loans comprise 
the loans with less than and more than a year maturity, respectively. Other earning 
assets consist of loans to special sectors (directed and specialized loans), inter-bank 
funds sold and investment securities (treasury bills, government bonds and other 
securities).
9  
Table 2 reports the annual averages and standard deviations of bank production 
variables (inputs and outputs) of the traditional Turkish banks for the study period 
(1981-90). In Turkey, real exchange rate policy is followed. Accordingly, the 
Turkish Lira is depreciated at the amount of purchasing power loss. Thus, all 
variables are expressed in $US to facilitate international comparison and alleviate 
the impact of inflation on bank variables. As the summary statistics reveals, there is 
a large variation in the levels of inputs and outputs across years. It is important to 
note that the level of short-term loans surpasses the level of long-term loans in 
every year. It appears that Turkish traditional banks extend predominantly liquid 
loans such as working capital credits. This indicates that Turkish non-financial 
firms face difficulty to finance their capital investment projects, as banks are 
reluctant to offer longer-term credits. Inflationary pressures curb asset 
transformation process of banks. In an environment where general price level is 
volatile, banks have hard time to collect long-term funds, which in turn inhibits 
their ability to create long-term assets.      
As Kwan (1997) points out, year-specific analyses are bound to fail to capture 
the changes in the regulatory environment and in the marketplace, which may have 
changed the underlying production frontiers (i.e.; technologies). Efficiency 
comparisons across time tell us only one part of the story. Productivity 
                                                           
9 Selection of the inputs and outputs may need further explanation and justification. Our definition of 
bank inputs and outputs takes into account the recent changes in Turkish banking. Zaim (1995) selected 
four inputs (labor, interest expenditures, depreciation expenditures, expenditures on materials), and four 
outputs (demand deposits, time deposits, short term loans, long term loans), whereas Altunbas et al. 
(1994) chose three inputs (labor, capital and total funds) and one output (total of short- and long-term 
loans, and net securities). First concern is that these two empirical studies did not account for directed 
lending (i.e.; loans to special sectors such as agriculture, housing or tourism) as they drew no distinction 
between directed lending and other lending. All state banks and some private banks make such 
subsidized loans and ignoring these activities could produce understated efficiency and productivity 
measures for such banks. Another point is concerning the investment security portfolios of banks. 
According to the Banks Association of Turkey (BAT) reports in 1996, 82% of the banks’ securities 
portfolio consisted of public sector securities such as treasury bills and government bonds by the end of 
1995. Ignoring the security investments in bank outputs could create biases for those banks, especially 
small banks, whose most operations revolve around the management of such investments. Another 
improvement is the inclusion of the very short-term loans (inter-bank loans).   
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improvements are not only as a result of the increases in efficiency but also as a 
result of progress in the technology. Even, as Wheelock and Wilson (1999) put it 
accurately, a favorable increase in productivity could cause an efficiency decline. A 
bank that stayed behind technological advances would become increasingly 
inefficient relative to banks adopting a new technology. Thus, a technological 
improvement initiated by a few banks, but not the average bank, could push the 
estimated frontier outward and explain the observed decrease in average bank 
efficiency.   
In order to demonstrate the dynamics of productivity and efficiency growth in 
the traditional banks during liberalization and not to fall in selection bias, we report 
the results for the full ten years between 1981 and 1990.
10 Although reforms started 
in 1980, they have accelerated after the mid-1980s. Accordingly, Denizer (1997) 
chose 1986 as the beginning of the post-liberalization period while studying the 
effects of financial liberalization and new bank entry on market structure and 
competition in Turkey. Similarly, Yulek (1998) also used 1986 as the basis year to 
study the effect of the liberalization on the real economy. Thus, following the 
earlier literature, we treat 1986 as the reference year in our analysis to represent the 
pre- and post- liberalization eras.  
Malmquist productivity change index and its components cannot be constructed 
without a reference technology. In a multi-period setting, the reference could be the 
technology of any year. We report the results relative to the fixed technology of the 
first year, 1981. The main reason for a fixed rather than changing technology 
reference is that when addressing productivity change, one is interested in 
improvements from a certain period; whether there was an improvement in 
performance relative to where one started. This also allows us to focus on the 
performance changes in traditional banks by excluding the new banks that entered 
the market after liberalization.
11 For the entire study period, the grand averages of 
the Malmquist total factor productivity change (TFPCH) index, and its two 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive components (1) efficiency change (EFFCH) and 
(2) technological change (TECCH) for all traditional banks and sub-groups of 
traditional banks are presented in Table 3. The two distinct components of the 
                                                           
10 The format of balance sheets and income statements has changed after 1980, dictating us the choice of 
1981, rather than 1980, as the beginning year of the analysis to be in accordance and conformity with the 
data used for the post liberalization era.   
11 Over the study period, the banks in our sample stay the same and only time period changes. Thus, the 
changes in bank performance will be predominantly driven by time, i.e., by the changes in the operating 
and regulatory environment of the traditional banks.   
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technical efficiency change (EFFCH), namely (1) pure technical efficiency change 
(PEFFCH) and (2) scale efficiency change (SCH) are also reported in the table.  
Table 3 
Average Productivity Growth (TFPCH) and its Components in the Traditional Banks
 











































































The arithmetic means of Malmquist index and its components summarized in the 
table are based on a fixed reference technology (data points in every year are 
compared to the efficient points both on the relevant year and 1981frontiers). Banks 
are modeled as multi-product firms. Accordingly, it is assumed that banks produce 
3 outputs from 3 inputs, where outputs are 1) short-term loans, 2) long-term loans 
(3), other earning assets, and inputs are 1) number of employees, 2) physical 
capital, and 3) sum of deposit and non-deposit funds. The results are based on data 
from 1981-90 period.  
In Table 3, the reference frontier is fixed, i.e., the technology of the year 1981. 
The data points in each year from 1982 to 1990 are compared to the points in 1981 
in the input-output space. As discussed, the Malmquist index [TFPCH] and its sub-
components [EFFCH (PEFFCH, SCH) and TECCH] attain a value greater than, 
equal to, or less than unity if bank has experienced growth, stagnation, or loss in 
the respective measures between periods, t and t+1, from the perspective of period t 
technology. Thus, any score greater than 1 indicates improvement, any score lower 
than 1 indicates deterioration in the relevant measure with respect to the reference 
year 1981. On average between 1982 and 1990, the results in Table 6 suggest that 
the traditional banks recorded about 15% productivity loss, 14% technical regress, 
0.04% efficiency increase, 1% pure efficiency increase and 1% scale efficiency 
decrease. These results indicate that the financial reforms and new bank entries did  
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not improve the productivity of traditional banks. On the contrary, such changes in 
the operating environment worsened their productivity. It seems that the major 
source of productivity loss is the contraction in the production frontier.  
The traditional banks have quite different ownership structures. As Isik and 
Hassan (2002) and Altunbas et al. (2001) discussed, differences in ownership can 
cause significant efficiency and productivity variations as private banks are more 
constrained by market forces than public banks. Private banks are expected to 
maximize the share value by minimizing input costs and maximizing output 
revenues while public banks are expected to serve mainly social goals. During the 
same period, on average, traditional public banks registered 10% productivity loss, 
15% technical regress, 7% efficiency increase, 10% pure efficiency increase and 
3% scale efficiency decrease. Traditional private banks demonstrated 15% 
productivity decline, 16% technical regress, 2% efficiency increase, 0% pure 
efficiency increase and 2% scale efficiency increase. On the other hand, traditional 
foreign banks showed 4% productivity loss, 7% technical regress, 6% efficiency 
increase, 1.6% pure efficiency decrease and 7% scale efficiency increase. The 
subgroup results also confirm the deterioration in productivity for traditional banks, 
which is driven mostly by downward shift in the frontier.  
Table 3 results are the grand averages of the performance scores. Although they 
reveal the central tendency of the measures, they hide the trends in those scores. 
There may be structural shifts in performance as the traditional banks took 
measures to cope with the changes in the environment. In order to detect the trends 
in the productivity growth and its constituents, we constructed Figure 1 (for all 
traditional banks), Figure 2 (for traditional public banks), Figure 3 (for traditional 
private banks), and Figure 4 (for traditional foreign banks). Bold linear lines in the 
figures are trend lines, which indicate the overall tendency in the respective 
measures. Again, any point above 1.0 means an improvement.  When we look at 
Figure 1.1, we see that except for 1982, the traditional banks did not register any 
productivity growth (TFPCH) until 1989. Likewise, except for 1982, these banks 
also have seen regress in their technologies (TECCH). However, the negative 
productivity growth (loss) has become increasingly less negative over time, 
implying an upward trend in the productivity of traditional banks (the trend line of 
the TFPCH index has a positive slope).  
The decomposition of TFPCH into its components in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 suggest 
that the productivity growth observed in the post-liberalization period for these  
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traditional banks were mainly due to increase in their efficiency (EFFCH), rather 
than progress in their technology (TECCH). However, there is an apparent 
development in technology after 1986, although still lower with respect to the basis 
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Fig. 2. Trends in the Performance of the Traditional PUBLIC Banks in Turkey 
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Fig. 3. Trends in the Performance of the Traditional PRIVATE Banks in Turkey 















There is a note-worthy improvement in the efficiency of traditional banks. They 
have experienced efficiency increase every year and at an increasing rate after 
1984. The productivity loss in the early phase of liberalization implies that these 
banks have faced some adaptation problems. PEFFCH (Figure 1.4) and SCH 
(Figure 1.5), the components of the EFFCH index (Figure 1.3), indicate that the 
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general tendency in management practices and scale changes is positive. As the 
slope of the PEFFCH index is steeper than that of SCH index, one implication is 
that efficiency increase in traditional banks is mostly driven by better management 
techniques that achieved more output per input rather than scale improvements.  
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As for the performance of the sub-group banks, they demonstrate similar results. 
As can be seen from Figures 2 through 4, although in varying degrees, all 
ownership forms, public, private and foreign, experienced increasing productivity 
mainly owing to efficiency increases. Efficiency increases in each type of banks 
seem to be driven by the improvement in pure technical efficiency rather than in 
scale, implying that management of banking operations has improved after the 
liberalization for these banks.  
Overall, the results indicate that all types of traditional banks benefited from 
liberal policies as evidenced by the increases in their productivity and efficiency. 
The group that flourished in this environment the most is private banks, domestic or 
foreign. The foreign banks are the only banks that indicate technical progress 
(innovation) in their technologies in a couple of cases in the advent of the 
deregulation. This supports the common impression in the sector about foreign 
banks, that they were the pioneers of many technological advances and new 
applications in the country. However, the above analysis is based on the averages. 
Thus, the results could be distorted by extreme observations, either too low or too 
high, in the sample. On the other hand, reporting what percentage of the banks 
showed productivity growth/loss, efficiency increase/decrease might help us 
overcome such bias. For this purpose, we will have a look at the development in the 
percentage of the traditional Turkish banks that experienced productivity gain or 
loss during the liberalization period, relative to the fixed reference technology. 
Table 4 gives the results for the full sample (all traditional banks), Table 5 for the 
traditional public banks, Table 6 for the traditional private banks, Table 7 for the 
traditional foreign banks. 
Looking at Table 4, we see that while in the early phase of the liberalization 
(1982-86), only 24% of all traditional banks experienced productivity growth, the 
majority, 76%, experienced productivity loss. On the other hand, between 1987-90, 
the percentage of the banks with productivity growth increased substantially 
reaching 44%, while the percentage of the banks with productivity loss decreased 
notably to 55%. The results also show that the percentage of banks recorded 
technical progress (regress), efficiency increase (decrease), pure efficiency increase 
(decrease), and scale efficiency increase (decrease) has considerably risen (fallen) 
between 1987-90 with respect to those between 1982-86, suggesting that on 
average, deregulation and new bank entry improved the performance of the 
traditional Turkish commercial banks. The subgroup results reported in Table 5, 9,  
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10, show that the percentage of public, private and foreign traditional banks that 
experienced improvement (worsening) in productivity, technology, and efficiency 
has tremendously increased (decreased) over time, as a result of financial reforms. 
The bank group with the highest percentage of banks that have experienced 
productivity growth between 1987-90 is traditional foreign banks (63%), followed 







Development in the Percentage of the Traditional TURKISH Banks with Productivity Gain or Loss / Efficiency Increase or Decrease  
   Productivity Change 
(TFPCH) 
Technology Change  
(TECCH) 





Scale Efficiency Change  
(SCH) 
Period #  Growth  Loss  No ∆ Progress Regress
 
No ∆  Inc.  Dec.  No ∆  Inc.  Dec.  No ∆  Inc.  Dec.  No ∆ 
82-81 28  32%  68%  0% 61%  39%  0%  39%  43%  18% 18% 50% 32% 57%  25%  18% 
83-81 28  25%  75%  0% 21%  79%  0%  25%  64%  11% 29% 36% 36% 25%  64%  11% 
84-81 28  21%  75%  4% 29%  68%  4%  25%  64%  11% 25% 50% 25% 21%  68%  11% 
85-81 28  21%  79%  0% 14%  86%  0%  39%  50%  11% 43% 21% 36% 32%  57%  11% 
86-81 28  18%  82%  0% 7%  93%  0%  61%  25%  14% 39% 32% 29% 68%  18%  14% 
87-81 28  32%  68%  0% 11%  89%  0%  64%  21%  14% 43% 29% 29% 68%  14%  18% 
88-81 28  29%  68%  4% 11%  89%  0%  61%  25%  14% 36% 36% 29% 68%  18%  14% 
89-81 28  57%  43%  0% 36%  64%  0%  71%  14%  14% 50% 18% 32% 68%  18%  14% 
90-81 28  57%  43%  0% 54%  46%  0%  61%  29%  11% 46% 32% 21% 61%  29%  11% 
Mean                           
82-86   24%  76%  1% 26%  73%  1%  38%  49%  13% 31% 38% 31% 41%  46%  13% 
87-90    44%  55%  1% 28%  72%  0%  64%  22%  13% 44% 29% 28% 66%  20%  14% 




































































































Development in the Percentage of the Traditional PUBLIC Banks with Productivity Gain or Loss / Efficiency Increase or Decrease  
     Productivity Change 
(TFPCH) 
Technology Change  
(TECCH) 
Efficiency Change  
(EFFCH) 
Pure Efficiency Change  
(PEFFCH) 
Scale Efficiency Change  
(SCH) 
Period #  Growth  Loss  No ∆ Progress Regress
 
No ∆  Inc.  Dec.  No ∆  Inc.  Dec.  No ∆  Inc.  Dec.  No ∆ 
82-81 8  25%  75%  0% 50%  50%  0%  38%  25%  38% 38%  25% 38% 50%  13%  38% 
83-81 8  25%  75%  0% 38%  63%  0%  25%  50%  25% 38%  13% 50% 25%  50%  25% 
84-81 8  25%  63%  13% 25%  63%  13%  25%  50%  25% 38%  25% 38% 25%  50%  25% 
85-81 8  25%  75%  0% 38%  63%  0%  25%  50%  25% 38%  25% 38% 25%  50%  25% 
86-81 8  25%  75%  0% 13%  88%  0%  50%  25%  25% 50%  25% 25% 50%  25%  25% 
87-81 8  25%  75%  0% 13%  88%  0%  63%  0%  38% 50%  0%  50% 63%  0%  38% 
88-81 8  38%  63%  0% 13%  88%  0%  50%  13%  38% 38%  25% 38% 63%  0%  38% 
89-81 8  50%  50%  0% 50%  50%  0%  50%  25%  25% 38%  13% 50% 38%  38%  25% 
90-81 8  63%  38%  0% 63%  38%  0%  25%  50%  25% 38%  38% 25% 25%  50%  25% 
Mean                             
82-86   25%  73%  3% 33%  65%  3%  33%  40%  28% 40%  23% 38% 35%  38%  28% 
87-90   44%  56%  0% 34%  66%  0%  47%  22%  31% 41%  19% 41% 47%  22%  31% 
82-90   33% 65%  1% 33%  65%  1% 39%  32%  29%  40%  21%  39% 40% 31% 29% 
Underlying Malmquist measures are calculated relative to fixed reference frontier, 1981. Banks are categorized according to the following: Productivity Growth: 
Malmquist Index (TFPCH)>1, Productivity Loss: TFPCH<1, Productivity Stagnation: TFPCH=1; Technical Progress: TECCH>1, Technical Regress: TECCH<1, 
Technical Stagnation: TECCH=1; Efficiency, Pure and Scale Efficiency Increase: EFFCH, PEFFCH, and SCH>1; Efficiency, Pure and Scale Efficiency Decrease: 



















































































































Development in the Percentage of the Traditional PRIVATE banks with Productivity Gain or Loss / Efficiency Increase or Decrease  
     Productivity Change 
(TFPCH) 
Technology Change  
(TECCH) 





Scale Efficiency Change  
(SCH) 
Period #  Growth  Loss  No ∆ Progress Regress  No  ∆  Inc.  Dec.  No ∆  Inc.  Dec.  No ∆  Inc.  Dec.  No ∆ 
82-81 16  31%  69%  0% 56%  44%  0% 50%  44%  6% 13%  69%  19%  69%  25%  6% 
83-81 16  25%  75%  0% 13%  88%  0% 25%  75%  0% 31%  50%  19%  25%  75%  0% 
84-81 16  19%  81%  0% 25%  75%  0% 31%  69%  0% 25%  63%  13%  25%  75%  0% 
85-81 16  19%  81%  0% 0%  100% 0% 50%  50%  0% 50%  25%  25%  44%  56%  0% 
86-81 16  13%  88%  0% 0%  100% 0% 63%  31%  6% 38%  44%  19%  75%  19%  6% 
87-81 16  19%  81%  0% 6%  94%  0% 63%  38%  0% 44%  50%  6% 69%  25%  6% 
88-81 16  19%  81%  0% 6%  94%  0% 63%  38%  0% 38%  50%  13%  69%  31%  0% 
89-81 16  56%  44%  0% 31%  69%  0% 81%  13%  6% 63%  19%  19%  81%  13%  6% 
90-81 16  63%  38%  0% 50%  50%  0% 81%  19%  0% 56%  31%  13%  75%  25%  0% 
Mean                          
82-86   21%  79%  0% 19%  81%  0% 44%  54%  3% 31%  50%  19%  48%  50%  3% 
87-90    39%  61%  0% 23%  77%  0% 72%  27%  2% 50%  38%  13%  73%  23%  3% 







































































































Trends in the Percentage of the Traditional FOREIGN Banks with Productivity Gain or Loss / Efficiency Increase or Decrease  
     Productivity Change 
(TFPCH) 
Technology Change  
(TECCH) 
Efficiency Change  
(EFFCH) 
Pure Efficiency Change  
(PEFFCH) 




#  Growth  Loss  No ∆ Progress  Regress
 
No ∆  Inc.  Dec.  No ∆  Inc.  Dec.  No ∆  Inc.  Dec.  No ∆ 
82-81 4  50%  50%  0% 100% 0%  0%  0%  75%  25% 0%  25%  75% 25%  50%  25% 
83-81 4  25%  75%  0% 25%  75% 0%  25%  50%  25% 0%  25%  75% 25%  50%  25% 
84-81 4  25%  75%  0% 50%  50% 0%  0%  75%  25% 0%  50%  50% 0%  75%  25% 
85-81 4  25%  75%  0% 25%  75% 0%  25%  50%  25% 25% 0%  75% 0%  75%  25% 
86-81 4  25%  75%  0% 25%  75% 0%  75%  0%  25% 25% 0%  75% 75%  0%  25% 
87-81 4  100%  0%  0% 25%  75% 0%  75%  0%  25% 25% 0%  75% 75%  0%  25% 
88-81 4  50%  25%  25% 25%  75%  0%  75%  0%  25% 25% 0%  75% 75%  0%  25% 
89-81 4  75%  25%  0% 25%  75% 0%  75%  0%  25% 25% 25%  50% 75%  0%  25% 
90-81 4  25%  75%  0% 50%  50% 0%  50%  25%  25% 25% 25%  50% 75%  0%  25% 
Mean                             
82-86   30%  70%  0% 45%  55% 0%  25%  50%  25% 10% 20%  70% 25%  50%  25% 
87-90   63%  31%  6% 31%  69% 0%  69%  6%  25% 25% 13%  63% 75%  0%  25% 
82-90   44%  53% 3%  39%  61%  0% 44%  31%  25%  17%  17%  67% 47%  28% 25% 
Underlying Malmquist measures are calculated relative to fixed reference frontier, 1981. Banks are categorized according to the following: Productivity Growth: 
Malmquist Index (TFPCH)>1, Productivity Loss: TFPCH<1, Productivity Stagnation: TFPCH=1; Technical Progress: TECCH>1, Technical Regress: TECCH<1, 
Technical Stagnation: TECCH=1; Efficiency, Pure and Scale Efficiency Increase: EFFCH, PEFFCH, and SCH>1; Efficiency, Pure and Scale Efficiency Decrease: 

























































































































Major Source of Productivity Growth or Loss / Efficiency Increase or Decrease in the Traditional 
Commercial Banks in Turkey (by ownership structure) 
  Productivity 
GROWTH 
mainly due to: 
Productivity 
LOSS 






mainly due to: 
Efficiency 
DECREASE 

























A. ALL TRADITIONAL BANKS 
82-81 28  18%  14%  36%  32%  0% 18%  21%  36%  7%  18% 
83-81 28  18%  7%  46%  29%  0% 21%  4%  29%  36%  11% 
84-81 28  14%  7%  50%  25%  4% 21%  4%  39%  25%  11% 
85-81 28  18%  4%  29%  50%  0% 29%  11%  21%  29%  11% 
86-81 28  14%  4%  7%  75%  0% 36%  25%  21%  4%  14% 
87-81 28  25%  7%  4%  64%  0% 43%  21%  21%  0%  14% 
88-81 28  29%  0%  7%  61%  4% 32%  29%  25%  0%  14% 
89-81 28  43%  14%  7%  36%  0% 36%  36%  7% 7%  14% 
90-81 28  36%  21%  7%  36%  0% 39%  21%  21%  7%  11% 
Mean                     
82-86   16%  7%  34%  42%  1% 25%  13%  29%  20%  13% 
87-90   33%  11%  6%  49%  1% 38%  27%  19%  4%  13% 
82-90   24%  9%  21%  45%  1% 31%  19%  25%  13%  13% 
B. TRADITIONAL PUBLIC BANKS 
82-81 8  13%  13%  25%  50%  0% 38%  0%  25%  0%  38% 
83-81 8  13%  13%  25%  50%  0% 25%  0% 0%  50%  25% 
84-81 8  25%  0%  25%  38%  13% 25% 0% 13%  38%  25% 
85-81 8  25%  0%  25%  50%  0% 25%  0%  25%  25%  25% 
86-81 8  25%  0%  0%  75%  0% 50%  0%  13%  13%  25% 
87-81 8  13%  13%  0%  75%  0% 50%  13%  0% 0%  38% 
88-81 8  38%  0%  0%  63%  0% 25%  25%  13%  0%  38% 
89-81 8  25%  25%  13%  38%  0% 38%  13%  0%  25%  25% 
90-81 8  25%  38%  0%  38%  0% 25%  0%  25%  25%  25% 
Mean                     
82-86   20%  5%  20%  53%  3% 33%  0%  15%  25%  28% 
87-90   25%  19%  3%  53%  0% 34%  13%  9%  13%  31% 
82-90   22% 11% 13%  53%  1%  33%  6%  13%  19%  29% 
In order to demonstrate the sources of productivity growth (technological 
progress or efficiency increase), and efficiency increase (pure efficiency increase or 
scale efficiency increase), we constructed the Table 8, which is mainly breakdown 
of Table 4 through Table 7. Panel A of the table gives the results for all traditional 
banks in the system, Panel B for traditional public banks, Panel C for traditional 
private banks, and Panel D for traditional foreign banks. When we look at Model 1 
(Panel A) and Model 2 (Panel B) results, we see that for the entire period, 1982-90, 
and two sub-periods, 1982-86, and 1987-90, the dominant source of the 
productivity growth is efficiency increase, not technical progress for traditional 
banks. Over the entire period, and sub-periods, the major source of productivity 
loss was technical regress rather than efficiency decrease. Moreover, most of the  
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banks that experienced efficiency increase owe it to the improvements on the 
management practices (pure efficiency increases) not to the improvements in scale 
(scale efficiency increases). Efficiency decreases in traditional banks result mainly 
from managerial mistakes in resource utilization rather than incorrect scale choices.  
Table 8 
(continued) 
   Productivity 
GROWTH 











mainly due to: 
Efficiency 
DECREASE 

























C. TRADITIONAL PRIVATE BANKS 
82-81 16  25%  6%  38%  31%  0% 13%  38%  44% 0%  6% 
83-81 16  25%  0%  56%  19%  0% 25% 0% 44%  31%  0% 
84-81 16  13%  6%  56%  25%  0% 25% 6% 50%  19%  0% 
85-81 16  19%  0%  31%  50%  0%  31% 19% 25% 25%  0% 
86-81 16  13%  0%  13%  75%  0% 31%  31%  31% 0%  6% 
87-81 16  19%  0%  6%  75%  0% 44%  19%  38% 0%  0% 
88-81 16  19%  0%  13%  69%  0% 38%  25%  38% 0%  0% 
89-81 16  44%  13%  6%  38%  0% 38%  44%  13% 0%  6% 
90-81 16  44%  19%  6%  31%  0% 50%  31%  19% 0%  0% 
Mean                 
82-86   19%  3%  39%  40%  0%  25% 19% 39% 15%  3% 
87-90    31%  8%  8%  53%  0% 42%  30%  27% 0%  2% 
82-90   24%  5%  25%  46%  0% 33%  24%  33% 8%  2% 
D. TRADITIONAL FOREIGN BANKS 
Model 1 
82-81 4  0%  50%  50%  0%  0% 0% 0%  25%  50% 25% 
83-81 4  0%  25%  50%  25%  0% 0%  25%  25%  25% 25% 
84-81 4  0%  25%  75%  0%  0% 0% 0%  50%  25% 25% 
85-81 4  0%  25%  25%  50%  0% 25% 0%  0% 50% 25% 
86-81 4  0%  25%  0%  75%  0% 25%  50% 0%  0%  25% 
87-81 4  75%  25%  0%  0%  0% 25%  50% 0%  0%  25% 
88-81 4  50%  0%  0%  25%  25% 25% 50%  0%  0%  25% 
89-81 4  75%  0%  0%  25%  0% 25%  50% 0%  0%  25% 
90-81 4  25%  0%  25%  50%  0% 25%  25%  25% 0%  25% 
Mean                 
82-86   0%  30%  40%  30%  0%  10% 15% 20% 30%  25% 
87-90   56%  6%  6%  25%  6% 25%  44% 6%  0%  25% 
82-90   25%  19%  25%  28%  3%  17%  28%  14%  17%  25% 
This table reports the major sources of developments in the productivity and efficiency of the Turkish 
banks by ownership. Underlying Malmquist measures are calculated relative to fixed reference frontier, 
1981. Definition of the sources is as follows:  Productivity GROWTH because of Technological 
Progress: TFPCH>1, and TECCH> (1 and EFFCH); Productivity GROWTH because of Efficiency 
Increase: TFPCH>1, and EFFCH> (1 and TECCH); Productivity LOSS because of Technological 
Regress: TFPCH<1 and TECCH<(1 and EFFCH); Productivity LOSS because of Efficiency Decrease: 
TFPCH<1, and EFFCH<(1 and TECCH); Efficiency INCREASE because of PTE Increase: EFFCH>1, 
and PEFFCH>(1 and SCH), Efficiency INCREASE because of SE Increase: EFFCH>1, and SCH>(1 and 
PEFFCH); Efficiency DECREASE because of PTE Decrease: EFFCH<1 and PEFFCH<(1 and SCH), 
Efficiency DECREASE because of SE Decrease: EFFCH<1, and SCH<(1 and PEFFCH).   
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Panels B, C, and D of the table suggest that main cause of productivity growth in 
public, private and foreign banks was efficiency increase. However, the role of 
technical progress in driving productivity is more emphasized in foreign banks, as 
the productivity growth is driven proportionately by both technical progress and 
efficiency increase. All types of banks that experienced productivity loss incurred 
the loss mainly due to technical regress. Efficiency increases in private and public 
banks are the product of improvements in pure technical efficiency, not in scale 
efficiency, while the opposite is true for the foreign banks. Efficiency decreases, on 
the other hand, are mainly as a result of managerial mistakes, not adverse wrong 
moves in scale for private and foreign banks, the opposite is true for public banks. 
These results indicate that scale adjustments are in wrong direction for public banks 
as these giant banks may be experiencing diseconomies of scale.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
By utilizing a DEA-type Malmquist Index approach, we investigated the initial 
effects of new bank entries and financial reforms introduced during the 1980s on 
the productivity, efficiency, and technology growth of the traditional Turkish 
commercial banks. Our results suggest that productivity and efficiency of the 
traditional banks has initially deteriorated. However, over time, especially in the 
second half of the 1980s, the traditional banks have recorded significant 
productivity improvements. It appears that it took traditional banks a number of 
years to adjust to the challenging conditions of the new operating environment. 
Overall, the productivity growth was mainly driven by the efficiency increases, i.e., 
substantial efforts of the inefficient banks to catch up with the best practice banks, 
rather than technical progress, i.e., the expansion of production frontier outward by 
the leading banks. Efficiency increases, on the other hand, were mainly as a result 
of the improvements in management practices rather than the improvements in 
scale. Our results by ownership indicate that once the uneven treatment between 
private banks and state banks is reduced gradually after liberalization, the 
performance difference between those banks has started to vanish because private 
banks, domestic or foreign, recorded much higher productivity and efficiency 
increases. These results imply that financial reforms put into effect after 1980 were 
somewhat successful in promoting competition among the traditional Turkish banks 
that have been enjoying a quiet life for a long time, and in initiating a noticeable 
upward trend in their productivity and efficiency performance.  
The strong efficiency increases observed among these banks indicate that 
Turkish banks are very good at “imitating” (replicating the production technologies 
of leading banks) and but not at innovating (yielding more outputs from a given  
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amount of inputs by inventing new techniques). The less than expected technical 
progress in traditional banks suggest that there may be still some market and 
regulatory distortions that prevent these banks from innovating and moving the 
production frontier outward. As advocated in the finance literature, deficiencies, 
which exist in a financial system, may distort the production and/or diffusion of 
financial innovation. Although product development and innovation is originally a 
marketing activity, Turkish banks have not had a marketing organization until 
1983. In may be that the real economy and its non-financial participants were not 
sophisticated enough to create substantial demand for sophisticated financial 
products and services, which would justify their research and development 
(production) costs. Furthermore, the less than perfect legal infrastructure may be 
another impediment for the production of complicated financial contracts by 
Turkish banks. For instance, the delay in the inception of derivative instruments 
and markets in Turkey is closely related to the lack of sophistication in the 
marketplace and to the inexistence of strong legal system that will enforce these 
contracts. It appears that the internal performance of financial institutions (their 
efficiency, productivity, profitability, competitiveness and innovativeness, etc.) is 
closely related to the performance of their external environment (legal, social and 
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